## **Responses from P79 Definition Consultation**

Consultation issued 13 June 2002

Representations were received from the following parties:

No	Company	File Number	No. Parties Represented
1.	Entergy-Koch Trading Ltd	P79_DEF_001	1
2.	LEG	P79_DEF_002	4
3.	Intergen (UK) Ltd	P79_DEF_003	4
4.	NGC	P79_DEF_004	1
5.	SEEBOARD Energy	P79_DEF_005	1
6.	Aquila Networks	P79_DEF_006	1
7.	Innogy	P79_DEF_007	6
8.	TXU	P79_DEF_008	21
9.	British Gas Trading	P79_DEF_009	1
10.	British Energy	P79_DEF_010	4
11.	Scottish Power	P79_DEF_011	5

#### P79 CONSULTATION

Parties and other interested parties are invited to respond to this consultation expressing their views with respect to the matters contained within this document. In particular views are sought in respect of the following questions. Respondents are invited to supply the rationale for their responses

Respondent:	Entergy-Koch Trading Ltd
Responding on Behalf of	Please list all Parties responding on behalf of (including the respondent company if relevant). Entergy-Koch Trading Ltd

	Question	Response Yes/No
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating default prices to ensure that:	Yes
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and	
	Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services     Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?	

Rationale: The current default rules are open to manipulation and were not designed to be used to the extent that they are currently. A change to the default rules will also allow a rational review of the BRL mechanism in that by setting BRL to zero the bid /offer spread will not be set to zero.

## 02 The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer Yes should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that: An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially

- eligible to set the default SBP value) if:
- 1. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 2. The accepted volume  $QAO_{ii}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).
- A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:
- 1. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and

2. The accepted volume  $QAB^n_{ij}$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document). Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why? Rationale: It resolves most of the issues related to the current default rules without being overly complex Q3 Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure? Rationale: Q4 Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have No not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any **Assessment Procedure for this Modification?** Please state what the issues are: Q5 Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79? No Please state your comments

#### P79\_DEF\_002 - LEG

#### Consultation

Parties and other interested parties are invited to respond to this consultation expressing their views with respect to the matters contained within this document. In particular views are sought in respect of the following questions.

Respondent:	Liz Anderson
Responding on Behalf of :	LEG plc (representing London Electricity plc, Sweb Ltd, Jade Power Generation Ltd, Sutton Bridge Power Ltd).

Question	Response
	Yes/No

Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for cald default prices to ensure that:	culating	Yes
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some volume; and	available	
	Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	Services	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Obje	u agree	
	<b>nale:</b> This modification better meets objective C ( promoting compting efficiency in the implementation of the BSC. See text of mod proposal		; Objective D
Q2	The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:	methods in that t	ee that these are desirable they represent and generally
	1) An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:	a simple and generally accurate way to identify if the bid or offer has any applicable volume during the half-hour.	
	<ul> <li>a) The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and</li> </ul>		
	b) The accepted volume ${\rm QAO}^{\rm n}_{~\rm ij}$ is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).		
	2) A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:		
	<ul> <li>a) The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and</li> </ul>		
	b) The accepted volume $QAB^{n}_{ij}$ is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).	VEC	
	Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?	YES - see above	
Q3	Can you envisage any alternative Modifications that the Modi Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, sho Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Proc	uld the	No
Q4	Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe not been identified or have been overlooked and that sho progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modified	ould be	No
Q5	Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P7	9?	No

## **P79 CONSULTATION**

Parties and other interested parties are invited to respond to this consultation expressing their views with respect to the matters contained within this document. In particular views are sought in respect of the following questions. Respondents are invited to supply the rationale for their responses

Respondent:	
Responding on Behalf of	Please list all Parties responding on behalf of (including the respondent company if relevant).

	Question	Response Yes/No
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating default prices to ensure that:	Yes
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and	
	Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?	

Rationale: The system prices should, as far as possible, reflect the true costs of balancing the system and reallocate those costs equitably to parties in imbalances. It is therefore appropriate that the Price Adjustment element be included and inappropriate that bid or offers that are not truly available should set default prices.

sh	The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:	
•	An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:	
3.	The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and	
4.	The accepted volume ${\rm QAO}^{\rm n}_{\rm ij}$ is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).	
	A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially	

eligible to set the default SSP value) if: 3. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and 4. The accepted volume  $QAB^{n}_{ij}$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document). Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why? Rationale: Default prices should only be set by bids or offers that are truly available but have not been accepted. The above definition appears to be a correct interpretation of this intention. Q3 Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure? Rationale: Q4 Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have No not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any **Assessment Procedure for this Modification?** Please state what the issues are: Q5 Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79? No Please state your comments

P79\_DEF\_004 - NGC

#### **P79 CONSULTATION**

Respondent:	Richard Lavender
Responding on Behalf of	Please list all Parties responding on behalf of (including the respondent company if relevant). National Grid

	Question	Response Yes/No
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating default prices to ensure that:	Yes
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and	
	Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services     Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?	

Rationale: The proposal will make default energy prices more meaningful and costreflective and therefore meets BSC Objective (c) "promoting effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity..."

## The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:

Yes

- An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:
- 5. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 6. The accepted volume  $QAO_{ij}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).
- A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:
- 5. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 6. The accepted volume  $\mathsf{QAB}^n_{\ ij}$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).

Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?

Ratio	Rationale:		
Q3	Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure?	No	
Ratio P74/I	nale: However, the BSC Panel should have due regard to the inte P78.	raction with	
Q4	Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modification?	No	
Please state what the issues are:			
Q5	Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79?	No	
Pleas	e state your comments		

## P79\_DEF\_005 - SEEBOARD Energy

## **P79 CONSULTATION**

Respondent:	Dave Morton
Responding on Behalf of	SEEBOARD Energy Limited

	Question	Respons Yes/No	
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating	Please s	see
	default prices to ensure that:	Q5.	
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available		

volume; and

• Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.

In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?

#### Rationale:

- The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:
  - An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:
  - 7. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
  - 8. The accepted volume  $QAO_{ij}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).
  - A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:
  - 7. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
  - 8. The accepted volume  $QAB_{ij}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).

Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?

### Rationale:

Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure?

#### Rationale:

O4 Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modification?

Please state what the issues are:		
Q5	Q5 Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79?	
Diago state your comments		

### Please state your comments

We have no opinions on this modification and if it would better facilitate Applicable BSC Objectives.

## P79\_DEF\_006 - Aquila Networks

Dear Kathryn,

Please find that the response from Aquila Networks plc to P79: Revised Rules for Default Energy Imbalance Pricing is 'No comment'.

Regards, Jennifer Kelly

On behalf of Rachael Gardener Deregulation Control Group & Distribution Support Office **AQUILA NETWORKS** 

## P79\_DEF\_007 - Innogy

## **P79 CONSULTATION**

Respondent:	Bill Reed
Responding on Behalf of	Please list all Parties responding on behalf of (including the respondent company if relevant). This response is on behalf of Innogy plc, npower Limited, Innogy Cogen Trading Limited, npower Direct Limited, npower Northern Limited, npower Yorkshire Limited

Question	Respons	е
	Yes/No	

#### Q1 Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating Yes default prices to ensure that:

- A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and
- Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.

In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?

#### Rationale:

The current defaulting rules are inadequate in terms of providing robust and meaningful prices.

#### The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer Q2 should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:

- An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:
- 9. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 10. The accepted volume QAO<sup>n</sup><sub>ii</sub> is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).
- A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:
- 9. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 10. The accepted volume  $QAB^n_{ij}$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).

Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?

#### Rationale:

The approach represents a pragmatic means of deriving an acceptable test for "feasibility" of bids and offers.

Q3 Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure?

Yes

#### Rationale:

While recognising the complexity of using greater than n=1 (or n=-1) offers (or bids), it may be appropriate to consider this issue in further detail. For example, by ruling out all bids and offers with acceptances may rule out n=2 (or n=-2) offers (or bids) when there is a greater likelihood that they would be taken when compared with other n=1 (or n=-1) offers (or bids) could result in less "reasonable" prices for the default price. The process of deriving a default price could be based on ranking all "feasible" offers (and bids) to identify the most likely offer (or bid) to be selected (irrespective of n number). This could result in more reasonable "feasible" prices (subject of course to not requiring significant development costs to deliver).

Q4 Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modification?

Please state what the issues are:

Q5 Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79?

Please state your comments

P79\_DEF\_008 - TXU

#### **P79 CONSULTATION**

Respondent:	Philip Russell
Responding on Behalf of	21 TXU BSC Parties

	Question	Response Yes/No
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating default prices to ensure that:	
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and	
	Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Ralancing Services	

	Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?	Yes
	<b>nale:</b> it seems reasonable that the prices would be more appropriate if the volum le of being delivered.	e was actually
Q2	The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:	
	An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:	
	11. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and	
	12. The accepted volume $QAO^n_{ij}$ is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).	
	A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:	
	11. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and	
	12. The accepted volume $QAB^n_{ij}$ is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).	
	Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?	Yes
Ratio	nale: Seems the most pragmatic (and hopefully reasonably priced) way of doing it.	
Q3	Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure?	Not at present
Ratio	nale:	
Q4	Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modification?	No

Please state what the issues are:		
Q5	Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79?	No
Pleas	e state your comments	•

## P79\_DEF\_009 - British Gas Trading

## **P79 CONSULTATION**

Respondent:	Danielle Lane
Responding on Behalf of	British Gas Trading Ltd

	Question	Response Yes/No
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating default prices to ensure that:	Yes
	• A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and	
	• Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?	
Ratio	Rationale:	
It is no	It is not appropriate that default rules are being used to set cashout prices in 23% of cases.	
Q2	The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:  • An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially	No

- eligible to set the default SBP value) if:
- 13. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 14. The accepted volume  $QAO_{ij}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).
- A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:
- 13. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 14. The accepted volume  $QAB_{ij}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).

Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?

#### Rationale:

We are unhappy that the approach of using integrated (MWh) values over the Settlement Period causes default prices to be set by bids and offers for volumes that cannot be delivered. This means that default prices are still liable to be unreflective of actual energy balancing costs and not robust against manipulation (either deliberate or accidental).

O3 Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure, should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure?

Yes

#### Rationale:

It may be possible to use either an average of SBP or SSP for the same Settlement Period using the most recent [3] settlement periods for which SSP or SBP are available and non-defaulting or an average of the periods either side if they are non-defaulting and on the same day.

O4 Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modification?

Yes

#### Please state what the issues are:

How is it possible that bids/offers can be posted that cannot be accepted by the SO without some actions being taken against parties?

Q5 Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79?

No

#### Please state your comments

## P79\_DEF\_010 - British Energy

## **P79 CONSULTATION**

Respondent:	Rachel Ace
Responding on Behalf of	British Energy Generation, Eggborough Power Ltd, British Energy Power and Energy Trading

	Question	Response Yes/No
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating default prices to ensure that:	Yes
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and	
	• Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?	
Ratio	nale: Default prices should be based on the same principles as non default	prices
Q2	The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:	No comments
	• An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:	
	15. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and	
	16. The accepted volume $QAO^n_{\ ij}$ is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).	
	A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:	
	15. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and	
	16. The accepted volume QAB <sup>n</sup> ii is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this	

	document).  Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?	
Ratio	nale:	
No cor	nments	
Q3	Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the	No
	Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure,	comments
	should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure?	
Rationale: No Comments		
Q4	Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modification?	No Comments
Please state what the issues are: No Comments		
Q5	Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79?	No
		Comments
Please state your comments No Comments		

## P79\_DEF\_011 - Scottish Power

## **P79 CONSULTATION**

Respondent:	John W Russell
Responding on Behalf of	Please list all Parties responding on behalf of (including the respondent company if relevant).
	Scottish Power UK Plc.; Scottish Power Energy Trading Ltd.; Scottish Power  Generation Ltd.: Scottish Power Energy Retail Ltd.: SP Transmission Ltd.

	Question	Response Yes/No
Q1	Modification Proposal P79 seeks to amend the rules for calculating default prices to ensure that:	
	A Bid or Offer won't set the default price unless it has some available volume; and	
	Default prices include the Price Adjustment element of Balancing Services     Adjustment Data (BSAD), in the same way as non-default prices.	
	In principle (and to the extent that you're able to express a view in the absence of any assessment of implementation costs), do you agree that this change would better facilitate the Applicable BSC Objectives?	YES

#### Rationale:

This change better facilitates efficiency in the implementation of the balancing and settlement arrangements as energy imbalance prices would better reflect the underlying energy imbalancing costs. Effective competition would also be better served as any possible 'rigging' element of default prices would be removed.

# Q2 The PIMG has investigated how to determine whether a Bid or Offer should be regarded as having available volume for the purposes of Modification Proposal P79, and is proposing that:

- An Offer will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SBP value) if:
- 17. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Offers with lower positive Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is less than the MWh volume of MEL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 18. The accepted volume  $QAO_{ij}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).
- A Bid will be regarded as having available volume (and hence potentially eligible to set the default SSP value) if:
- 17. The MWh value of FPN (plus the total MWh volume of any Bids with higher negative Bid-Offer Pair Numbers) is more than the MWh volume of MIL (as explained in section 5.1 of this document); and
- 18. The accepted volume  $QAB_{ij}^n$  is zero (as explained in section 5.2 of this document).

Do you agree that this is the most appropriate interpretation of Modification Proposal P79? If not, what interpretation would you prefer, and why?

YES

#### Rationale:

This is the most appropriate interpretation of the modification, especially as it prohibits offers and bids with not substantiated volume to set the default price. It also provides a fairer representation of market conditions if this element of default pricing is removed.

Q3	Do you believe that there are any alternative Modifications that the	NO
	Modification Group should consider during the Assessment Procedure,	

	should the Panel decide to submit the Modification to the Assessment Procedure?		
Ratio	Rationale:		
No Comment.			
Q4	Does the Modification Proposal raise any issues that you believe have not been identified so far and that should be progressed as part of any Assessment Procedure for this Modification?	NO	
Please state what the issues are:			
No Comment			
Q5	Do you have any further comments on Modification Proposal P79?	NO	
Please state your comments			
No Comment			